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A B S T R A C T   
We show that press freedom has a role in constraining business corruption. Using firm-level data, 
we find that countries with greater press freedom have significantly fewer incidences of bribery 
involving public officials. In particular, we find that a free press is associated with a substantial 
reduction in the percentage of firms that report corruption during interactions with tax officials 
and when obtaining construction permits. Furthermore, we find that fewer businesses in these 
countries report that corruption is the biggest problem that they face. These findings highlight the 
role of an independent media in combating corruption.   
1. Introduction 
In 2017, Telia Company agreed to pay penalties of at least $965 million to the United States and international authorities after the 
media uncovered corrupt payments involving telecom contracts in Uzbekistan (Schoenberg and Dolmetsch, 2017). In 2016, Vim-
pelCom agreed to pay $835 million to settle a case following a media investigation of corrupt payments (Scannell, 2016). Cases of this 
kind illustrate the important role that the media and investigative journalists play in helping societies to detect and punish corruption. 
Existing studies confirm this role, finding that press freedom is associated with perceived corruption and that media attention can 
plausibly reduce corruption through several channels, including enhanced corporate governance. 
We find that a free press reduces business corruption across multiple indicators of both press freedom and corruption. Using the 
percentage of firm-state interactions in which a bribe was expected or requested as a proxy for firms’ engagement with corruption, we 
show that firms in countries with a free press report substantially less corruption. Moreover, we show that a free press is associated 
with having fewer businesses in these countries report that corruption is the biggest problem that they face. Additionally, we find that a 
free press is associated with a substantial reduction in the percentage of firms that say a bribe was expected or requested during in-
teractions with tax officials. The latter finding is in line with the content of the Panama and Paradise papers, which revealed the use of 
offshore financial centers for illegal purposes, such as tax evasion and fraud.1 
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Our findings have several implications. First, they suggest that a free press can significantly reduce the cost of doing business, as 
previous studies find that bribery imposes large costs on a business (Kaufmann and Wei, 1999).2 Second, our findings add to the 
substantial literature on the importance of a free press in combating corruption in other contexts (see, e.g., Flavin and Montgomery, 
2019), by showing that this association is evident when we measure corruption using firms’ experiences. Finally, our results highlight 
the importance of understanding the media environment for firms that engage in cross-border activities. 
This article is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the literature on the role of the media as a monitor of corruption. In 
Section 3, we outline our data and method. Section 4 describes our findings regarding the overall association between corruption and 
the press freedom index. Section 5 describes our findings from models that interact the press freedom index with the level of de-
mocracy. Section 6 concludes this article with a discussion of the implications of our findings for research and policy. 
2. The media as a monitor of corruption 
2.1. Theory 
The notion that an independent media can play an important role in controlling corruption has good theoretical support. The 
Becker (1968) model of crime suggests that would-be criminals weigh the expected costs of crimes against their expected benefits. The 
model finds that would-be criminals are dissuaded from committing a crime if the punishment or likelihood of detection increases. To 
the extent that an independent media increases the likelihood of being caught (and imposes reputational cost), a free press should act 
as a deterrent to individuals who are contemplating the commission of a crime. In our study, these individuals are either public officials 
who elicit bribes from businesses through extortive corruption or businesses that offer bribes to obtain favorable treatment, whether 
through collusion with public officials—collusive corruption—or in response to extortive corruption. The role of the press in moderating 
corruption rests critically on the assumption that these individuals are sensitive to relatively small changes in the odds of detection. In 
an experimental bribery game, Abbink et al. (2002) present findings that support this assumption, showing that a very low chance of 
being caught, combined with severe punishment, significantly reduces the likelihood of offering or accepting a bribe. Because giving or 
receiving a bribe is a criminal act in most jurisdictions, the more that the media increases the odds of detection, the less that firms 
engage in corruption. 
Two relevant streams of literature support the link between press freedom and corruption in business. The first stream finds a strong 
relationship between press freedom and the perception of corruption.3 Brunetti and Weder (2003), for example, argue that press 
freedom can be used as an external control on corruption and test this argument using cross-country data on 125 countries over the 
period 1994− 1998. They find that an improvement in press freedom of one standard deviation reduces corruption by 0.4− 0.9 points 
(on a scale from 0 to 6). Adsera et al. (2003) find that a well-informed electorate, as captured by the interaction of newspaper cir-
culation and democracy, explains between half and two-thirds of the variance in the levels of government performance and corruption, 
using panel data on 100 countries over the period 1980–1995 and a cross-national analysis of indicators of corruption and governance 
effectiveness in 1997–1998. Lindstedt and Naurin (2010) test whether transparency, such as press freedom, is enough to change 
outcomes, finding that transparency requirements that are implemented by an agent are less effective than transparency institutions 
without control by an agent, such as a free press. Tang et al. (2019) find that the level of social media use in a country affects the level of 
perceived corruption there. Further studies have extended the literature to incorporate alternative estimation strategies (Freille et al., 
2007). Lima and Delen (2020) take a machine learning approach and do not find evidence that the media are likely to reduce cor-
ruption but find that government integrity and property rights are among the best predictors. Charron (2009) considers the role of 
sociopolitical integration, and Chowdhury (2004) and Kalenborn and Lessmann (2013) examine the joint impact of democracy and 
press freedom on corruption. We consider the democracy strand of the literature in further detail in Section 5. 
The second relevant strand highlights the relationship between the media and firm behavior. These papers suggest that media 
attention can reduce business corruption through several channels. First, it can put pressure on directors and managers to act in line 
with acceptable social norms, such as honesty and integrity. Dyck et al. (2008), for example, find that coverage in the Anglo-American 
press increases the probability that a Russian firm’s corporate governance violation will be reversed. Jaakson et al. (2019) find that 
business managers’ opinions regarding corruption are influenced by normative concerns. Although these studies link media attention 
to corruption, many other studies highlight its link to other relevant dimensions of firm behavior that often feature in 
corruption-related scandals. Bednar (2012), for instance, shows that media attention is an important determinant of job security for 
chief executive officers, executive compensation, and board membership. 
Second, media attention has been shown to have a remarkable impact on firms’ practices and corporate policies. El Ghoul et al. 
(2016) show that firms located in countries where the media have more freedom engage in more corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
activities. Krishnamurti et al. (2018) find that firms that are more engaged in CSR activities are less exposed to corruption risk. 
Furthermore, they find that, in emerging countries, CSR engagement reduces corruption risk only when press freedom is in place. 
Kanagaretnam et al. (2018) demonstrate that a privately owned and competitive media sector is associated with a lower probability of 
2 In addition to these direct costs, recent studies also find that corruption affects the business environment through excessive red tape (Breen and 
Gillanders, 2012), less efficient public investment (Del Monte and Papagni, 2001), and poor infrastructure (Gillanders, 2014; Kenny, 2009; Tanzi 
and Davoodi, 1997), not to mention broader negative effects on society. 
3 The empirical literature is largely consistent on this point. However, Vaidya (2005) presents a theoretical model that allows for collusion be-
tween an independent media and the government. The model suggests that perverse incentives are possible that favor corruption. 
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aggressive tax behavior. Collins et al. (2009) find that some executives rationalize acts of corruption; thus to the extent that a free press 
exposes the damage from corruption, it could make such rationalization more difficult. 
Finally, media attention and its attendant impact on public pressure is often critical in catalyzing support for anticorruption ini-
tiatives. For example, the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance Committee was created in response to media and public opinion 
after several financial scandals in the United Kingdom, such as the collapse of Maxwell Group and the Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International in the 1980s.4 
2.2. The problem with perceptions of corruption 
All the studies that explore the relationship between press freedom and corruption use indices based on expert opinions of country- 
level corruption such as the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) or Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI). Although the CPI and other indicators are useful resources, many researchers argue that they are potentially misleading in some 
contexts. Svensson (2003), Reinikka and Svensson (2006), Treisman (2007), and Fan et al. (2009) claim that they suffer from 
perception biases. Knack (2007) and Kenny (2009) believe that they have not kept up with reality. Finally, Razafindrakoto and 
Roubaud (2010) find ideological and cultural biases in experts’ evaluations of corruption in sub-Saharan Africa. 
In addition to these known biases, expert indices are particularly problematic in the context of our study—that is, the expert 
opinions that make up the CPI might respond to press freedom independently of actual corruption levels, predisposing the index to 
correlation with press freedom. This is because experts rely on information to form opinions and might perceive the absence of a free 
press, along with other restrictions on information, as evidence of malfeasance, regardless of actual corruption levels. Without recourse 
to data on actual corruption levels, we cannot be certain that a free press reduces corruption. A free press might influence corruption 
perceptions even if the media are ineffective at curbing real corruption. Indeed, there is no shortage of studies that question whether 
the media are doing a good job, particularly in societies that are highly polarized and tend to value hypercritical infotainment over 
critical impartiality and investigative journalism (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). 
Finally, even if one considers the CPI a valid indicator of actual corruption, it is not ideal for studying corruption in business 
because it does not distinguish between grand and petty corruption. The media might direct their gaze disproportionately on grand 
corruption or corruption that preys on particular individuals, while neglecting less sensational types of everyday corruption. An as-
sociation between press freedom and one type of corruption does not imply an association with another. 
2.3. Firms’ corruption experiences 
Scholars are increasingly turning to survey-based approaches to measure the level of corruption in different contexts. An appro-
priately designed survey of households or firms can, according to Knack (2007: 257), “place a greater emphasis on experience and less 
on perceptions.” These survey data inspired a plethora of new studies that explore corruption in business, including the determinants of 
bribery at Asian firms (Wu, 2009), how the gender of owners and managers affects bribery (Breen et al., 2017), and how bribery affects 
firm growth (Fisman and Svensson, 2007). Furthermore, these data enable us to consider how press freedom affects corruption in the 
different contexts in which a business may have dealings with the state. In some contexts, acts of corruption are more likely to be 
extortive than collusive. Brunetti and Weder (2003) argue that the free press is the most effective institution for combating collusive 
corruption because internal control agencies, such as the police or another branch of the public service, could be vulnerable to capture 
or to being paid off. Not only does the press have a particular role to play in principle but competitive forces might drive it to play this 
role in practice. The incentives of journalists to investigate different types of corruption vary. It might be the case that a story about the 
solicitation of bribes for electricity connections is less newsworthy and valuable than a story about a conspiracy to reduce tax payments 
or bypass construction regulations. 
By studying corruption across different contexts in business, we can observe whether press freedom reduces corruption across the 
board or helps only in the more newsworthy cases of collusive corruption. Again, the ICRG and the CPI do not distinguish between 
these types of corruption whereas the data that we employ enable us to look at corruption in different contexts, some of which are more 
likely to be cases of collusion than others. 
In summary, many studies find a strong link between press freedom and corruption perceptions, but no previous work examines this 
topic from the perspective of firms’ experiences. On the one hand, the existing literature provides a clear mechanism through which 
business corruption should be reduced by a free press, through its disciplining of businesses and public officials. On the other hand, the 
inherent problems with the CPI and other perception indicators suggest that the role of press freedom may have been overstated. By 
using arguably more objective measures of corruption and exploring business corruption across several contexts, we demonstrate that 
this fear is largely unfounded. 
4 This argument is in line with the implications from an emerging literature that sees the business press as an information intermediary (Bushee 
et al., 2010). 
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3. Data and variables 
3.1. Measuring corruption 
We measure corruption using the World Bank Enterprise surveys, which are representative surveys of formal firms in the 
manufacturing and services sectors. We use two measures in these surveys of firm involvement in corruption. The first, Bribe, is the 
percentage of transactions in which a gift or informal payment was requested or expected by a public official. The survey questions on 
which this percentage is based take the following form: “In reference to X, was an informal gift or payment expected or requested?” 
when X is seeking access to utilities, permits, or licenses or during tax inspections. The question is worded so as not to incriminate the 
respondent or the firm. As such, it serves as a better proxy for firms’ engagement in corruption than survey questions that use language 
explicitly related to bribery. 
The second measure of corruption (Obstacle) is the percentage of firms that identify corruption as the biggest obstacle they face. 
Whereas the first measure captures firms’ broad experience of corruption more directly, the second measure is useful because it asks 
firms to locate corruption within a hierarchy of difficulties, rather than simply stating that corruption is a problem. The validity of 
Obstacle as a measure of corruption is supported by Mawejje and Sebudde (2019), who study Ugandan firms and find a negative 
correlation between a firm’s perception that corruption is a constraint and its expectation about future performance. 
3.2. Measuring press freedom 
Our primary measure of press freedom comes from Freedom House, which compiles an index based on expert assessments and an 
in-house analysis of newspapers and a variety of government and nongovernment sources.5 The index ranges between 0 (best) and 100 
(worst). Furthermore, Freedom House uses a categorical approach based on the value of the index, dividing countries into groups 
whose press is considered “free,” “partly free,” and “not free.” We employ both the raw index and these distinctions in our analysis. In 
addition, we use an alternative measure of press freedom produced by Reporters Without Borders (RWB), which produces a global 
ranking of press freedom based on an expert questionnaire and data on abuses and acts of violence against journalists during the period 
of assessment. 
3.3. Summary statistics 
As the Enterprise Surveys are not carried out in every country every year, we have an unbalanced panel. Our combined dataset 
consists of 110 countries over the period 2006–2016. The summary statistics and definitions of our main variables of interest are in 
Appendix Table A1. On average, 15.28 percent of transactions involved a bribe request, but with great variation: from 0 percent of 
firms in Estonia to 65.2 percent in the Republic of Yemen. Interestingly, although Yemen is considered a corrupt country and is 
generally perceived as such, some other countries that are often ranked as highly corrupt perform well on this metric. For example, the 
data for Eritrea suggest that no firms paid bribes. This might indicate that firms in some autocracies might be less willing to answer 
honestly out of fear of reprisal (Shockley et al., 2017), reinforcing the need to control for democracy and political freedoms and 
supporting our decision to use a corruption outcome (Obstacle) that does not refer explicitly to firms’ involvement in bribery.6 On 
average, 7.39 percent of firms view corruption as their biggest obstacle, ranging from zero in some countries to 32.5 percent in 
Panama. Thus, the corruption outcomes cover a broad range across the world. 
Similarly, we see considerable variation in press freedom. From 2005 to 2016, the country with the best press freedom score is 
Norway, with an average of 10. North Korea has the worst score, averaging 97 for this period. Overall, the average value of press 
freedom in our dataset is 53, varying substantially across groups of countries: the average score is 22 for countries that are members of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 58 for sub-Saharan Africa, 41 for Latin America and the 
Caribbean, 67 for the Middle East and North Africa, and 59 for South Asia. 
3.4. Empirical approach 
In this study, we estimate equations of the following form:  
Corruptionit = β0 + β1Pressit + βxit + εit                                                                                                                                            
where Corruptionit reflects the average corruption experience of firms in country i and time t, Pressit is a measure of press freedom, xit is a 
vector of control variables, and εit is an error of the usual type. In addition, we control for a variety of factors that have been identified 
in the previous literature on corruption and press freedom, namely, democracy (using the Polity IV index), gross domestic product 
5 The full methodology is available at https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press-2017-methodology/.  
6 Our results are robust to dropping the three countries—Eritrea, Estonia, and Israel—in which no firms report any bribery. 
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(GDP) per capita, and openness to international trade (defined as exports plus imports as a share of GDP). The last two variables come 
from the World Development Indicators.7 
The correlation of press freedom with its lag is 0.9944; so, given the time invariance of our main variable of interest, we do not 
estimate fixed effects models, using pooled ordinary least squares (OLS), instead, as our main estimation method.8 Following existing 
studies (Brunetti and Weder, 2003; Chowdhury, 2004; Kalenborn and Lessmann, 2013), we also estimate random effects models to 
account for unobserved heterogeneity, though we acknowledge that the random effects assumption might not be valid, as the 
country-specific effect is plausibly correlated with the independent variables.9 Our preferred specification, therefore, includes 
dummies for sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, OECD member countries, and year dummies. They capture broad 
cultural, historical, political, and economic characteristics and trends. These characteristics surely matter, as Scholtens and Dam 
(2007) find that cultural values are associated with business ethics—in particular, that firms in countries with high individualism 
scores pay more attention to their ethical policies, including governance of corruption and bribery. To capture the cultural variation 
within these broad regional groupings, we included the Konjunkturforschungsstelle (KOF) Globalization Index, indicator of social 
globalization in additional tests, as it is an indicator that includes information on cultural globalization. We find that it is a statistically 
significant predictor but does not alter our findings with respect to corruption.10 
Several previous studies have employed instrumental variable strategies to address concerns regarding endogeneity. Instruments 
such as the share of the population that is Protestant and the share that speak a major European language have been used (Brunetti and 
Weder, 2003) and so have ethnic fractionalization and legal origin (Chowdhury, 2004). The notion that these country characteristics 
influence corruption only through an effect on press freedom is highly debatable, and, in any event, these instruments fail standard 
diagnostic tests in the case of our corruption measures, which are based on experience with corruption. Indeed, it is very difficult to 
envision an instrument that would satisfy the exclusion restriction. Essentially, one would need to think of a historical or cultural 
variable that had no plausible direct effect on corruption. 
Table 1 
Corruption and Press Freedom.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
OLS RE OLS OLS RE OLS  
Bribe Bribe Bribe Obstacle Obstacle Obstacle 
Press Freedom Index 0.21*** 0.18** 0.17** 0.10*** 0.09** 0.09**  
(0.076) (0.087) (0.077) (0.035) (0.037) (0.036) 
Democracy − 0.00 − 0.01 0.07 0.21 0.18 0.18  
(0.281) (0.318) (0.284) (0.132) (0.146) (0.132) 
GDP per capita (log) − 5.14*** − 4.72*** − 5.81*** 0.01 − 0.18 0.05  
(0.907) (1.082) (1.134) (0.419) (0.436) (0.541) 
Openness (log) 3.71 3.37 2.48 2.03** 1.99* 2.12**  
(2.262) (2.575) (2.214) (1.021) (1.128) (1.015) 
OECD   − 1.69   − 2.97*    
(2.194)   (1.532) 
Sub-Saharan Africa   − 7.80**   − 0.90    
(3.181)   (1.387) 
Latin America and the Caribbean   − 13.83***   0.40    
(4.727)   (2.453) 
Constant 43.37*** 44.37*** 43.40*** 1.47 4.34 − 2.22  
(9.291) (10.162) (11.574) (4.239) (4.448) (5.899)  
Observations 193 193 193 193 193 193 
R-squared 0.364 0.349 0.415 0.100 0.091 0.119 
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
7 We do not include standard Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), such as the rule of law and government effectiveness, in our specifications 
because they are highly correlated with measures of corruption. For example, the correlation between the WGI’s rule of law and control of cor-
ruption is 0.94. Thus, any of these indicators tend to overwhelm the significance of press freedom, as one measure of corruption is explaining 
another.  
8 In fixed effects models, we do not find evidence of a significant association; however, the high degree of serial correlation evident in our data 
(the correlation of press freedom with its tenth lag is 0.94) and the Hausman test both suggest that the fixed effects model is not appropriate for our 
data. To perform the test, we used the Hausman command in Stata 16, obtaining a test statistic of 1.55, with a p-value of 0.8173, suggesting that a 
fixed effects model is not appropriate.  
9 We conducted a likelihood-ratio test for the random effects model to probe the significance of the unobserved country-level heterogeneity. The 
test returns a value of 39.75 (p = 0.000). Although it indicates that the unobserved heterogeneity has predictive power, according to Wooldridge 
(2010, 469–524), it is not advisable to conduct this test if any kind of clustering or robust standard errors are used. Therefore, we argue that the test 
does not change our conclusions regarding the importance of press freedom and the other covariates. It also remains the case that the results of the 
random effects model are in line with our preferred specification.  
10 Additional test results are available from the authors on request as part of the replication set for this paper. 
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Furthermore, the time invariance of press freedom limits the range of alternative empirical approaches that we can use to test the 
robustness of our findings. For example, when Bribe is the dependent variable, we obtain a coefficient of 0.16 on the lagged press 
freedom index, whereas the contemporaneous index yields 0.17. Likewise, using the lag of Obstacle, we obtain a coefficient of 0.08, but 
when we use contemporaneous values, the coefficient is 0.09. All the aforementioned coefficients are statistically significant at the p <
0.05 level. As such, alternative estimators such as the generalized method of moments are not reliable, as lagged values of press 
freedom are correlated with the endogenous regressors but are not plausibly orthogonal to the error. 
4. Results 
4.1. Main results 
Our main findings are presented in Table 1. Columns 1–3 report the estimates for our main dependent variable of interest, Bribe, the 
percentage of transactions in which a gift or informal payment was requested by a public official. Column 1 is our base specification; 
column 2 presents estimates from a random effects model, and column 3 adds dummy variables to our base specification that capture 
broad global heterogeneity. Columns 4–6 repeat these specifications using Obstacle, the percentage of firms that identify corruption as 
their biggest obstacle. 
With regard to our first dependent variable, we find that a free press is associated with a statistically significant reduction in Bribe. 
This relationship holds in our random effects model, which allows for unobserved heterogeneity and when global dummy variables are 
added to our base specification. Moreover, the effect of press freedom is substantial: an improvement in press freedom of a one 
standard deviation (19.63) is associated with an average reduction in the proportion of public interactions in which a bribe was 
requested of 4.1 percent, a substantial change when one considers that the mean bribe in our sample is approximately 15 percent (with 
a standard deviation of 14 percent). 
For our second dependent variable, we find a strong association between a free press and Obstacle. We find that fewer firms in 
countries with press freedom report that corruption is their biggest constraint and that this association holds across all our alternative 
specifications. Our findings, therefore, support the notion that a free press serves as an effective deterrent to corruption in business. 
Table 2 presents estimates using alternative measures of press freedom and corruption. Columns 1–2 report estimates using Bribe 
and Obstacle as dependent variables and Freedom House’s categories of press freedom as explanatory variables. This scale ranks 
Table 2 
Robustness.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  
Bribe Obstacle Bribe Obstacle Gift Gift Gift 
Freedom House “not free” 10.05*** 8.12***     13.85***  
(3.417) (1.502)     (4.764) 
Freedom House “partly free” 0.08 5.65***     6.11**  
(1.823) (1.213)     (2.931) 
Reporters Without Borders Press Rank   0.08*** 0.04***  0.10**     
(0.027) (0.014)  (0.041)  
Press Freedom Index     0.17        
(0.120)   
Democracy 0.22 0.18 0.05 0.17 − 0.35 − 0.31 − 0.24  
(0.301) (0.114) (0.241) (0.120) (0.431) (0.355) (0.434) 
GDP per capita (log) − 5.88*** 0.48 − 5.65*** 0.19 − 6.22*** − 5.93*** − 5.69***  
(1.105) (0.534) (1.158) (0.540) (1.566) (1.572) (1.489) 
Openness (log) 2.03 2.42** 3.78 2.80*** 5.16 6.83* 5.30  
(2.141) (0.964) (2.347) (1.053) (3.273) (3.513) (3.240) 
OECD − 3.75 − 1.68 − 2.67 − 3.52** 1.55 0.59 1.94  
(2.328) (1.490) (2.019) (1.433) (2.896) (2.989) (3.163) 
Sub-Saharan Africa − 7.29** − 0.18 − 6.28* 0.09 − 5.79 − 3.71 − 4.64  
(3.068) (1.385) (3.324) (1.467) (4.368) (4.726) (4.281) 
Latin America and the Caribbean − 12.63*** 0.38 − 12.13** 1.39 − 15.46*** − 13.64** − 14.78***  
(4.737) (2.361) (4.679) (2.426) (5.766) (5.837) (5.669) 
Constant 46.06*** − 7.22 60.34*** 1.52 88.48*** 85.16*** 62.73***  
(9.935) (5.226) (11.770) (5.384) (18.506) (17.362) (14.455)  
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 193 193 193 193 191 191 191 
R-squared 0.452 0.197 0.418 0.128 0.373 0.387 0.391 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
N. Binhadab et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Economic Systems xxx (xxxx) xxx
7
countries as free (0–30), partly free (31–60), and not free (61–100). This is a worthwhile exercise, as small changes in the score might 
not be meaningful and there could conceivably be threshold levels of press freedom required for the relationship with corruption to 
become meaningful. In this exercise, we use dummy variables for not free and partially free—the base category is free. Column 1 
demonstrates that being not free, compared to free, is associated with an increase in Bribe. More specifically, Bribe is 10 percent higher 
in countries considered not free relative to those that are free. Interestingly, no statistically significant difference is found between 
countries that are partly free as opposed to those with full press freedom. Countries that lack a free press or have a partly free press do 
appreciably worse on Obstacle. Columns 3–4 repeat these specifications, substituting Freedom House’s indicator of press freedom with 
the Reporters Without Borders’ indicator. These tests show that an increase in press freedom is associated with less corruption across 
both measures of corruption. 
Columns 5–7 present estimates using an alternative measure of corruption: the percentage of firms expected to give gifts to public 
officials “to get things done.” The underlying survey question is: 
We’ve heard that establishments are sometimes required to make gifts or informal payments to public officials to “get things 
done” with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services, etc. On average, what percentage of total annual sales, or 
estimated total annual value, do establishments like this one pay in informal payments or gifts to public officials for this 
purpose? 
The question is worded so that respondents will not incriminate themselves; instead of being asked whether their firm is expected to 
give gifts, it refers to “establishments like this one.” Our central result is robust to several of these alternative indicators of corruption 
and press freedom. In column 5, our continuous measure of press freedom is not associated with corruption, as measured by informal 
gifts. However, the association is strong in columns 6 and 7, which use the categorical indicators from Reporters Without Borders and 
Freedom House, respectively. Together, these findings suggest the existence of a meaningful association between corruption in 
business and press freedom across multiple indicators. 
We performed two additional robustness checks. First, we present estimates using the individual political, legal, and economic 
components of the press freedom index. The results, presented in Appendix Table A2, show that the political and legal components are 
associated with Bribe and Obstacle, whereas the economic component is not. In a final robustness check, we clustered the standard 
errors at the country level to enable the correlation of error terms within a given country.11 This is problematic, given these particular 
data, as we have 193 observations spread across 110 countries. Because the number of observations for each country is low (one or two, 
occasionally three), there is not much clustering and thus no need for robust standard errors.12 However, if we cluster in this way, our 
main result with respect to Bribe remains significant at the p < 0.1 level, and our conclusions regarding Obstacle are unchanged. 
Table 3 
Corruption in All Contexts.   
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  
Collusive Collusive Extortive Extortive Extortive Extortive Procurement  
Tax Construction Water Electric Import Operating Government contract 
Panel A: Continuous Press Freedom 
Press Freedom Index 0.19** 0.19* 0.11 0.05 0.00 0.11 0.15  
(0.082) (0.108) (0.118) (0.079) (0.123) (0.102) (0.129) 
Constant 59.89*** 76.28*** 78.73*** 79.36*** 74.41*** 73.41*** 80.00***  
(13.219) (16.702) (18.691) (13.109) (19.090) (15.988) (20.030) 
R-squared 0.411 0.352 0.321 0.427 0.250 0.282 0.269  
Panel B: Categorical Press Freedom 
FH “not free” 10.78*** 10.09** 6.94 6.06 4.58 11.09** 9.74  
(3.544) (4.956) (5.305) (3.763) (5.107) (4.366) (6.574) 
FH “partly free” 0.34 − 2.02 − 1.36 − 0.87 − 4.45 − 0.94 4.90  
(1.820) (3.497) (3.543) (2.157) (2.861) (3.399) (4.589) 
Constant 46.50*** 66.49*** 73.67*** 80.06*** 47.70*** 61.06*** 79.01***  
(10.444) (15.225) (14.664) (12.496) (16.046) (12.966) (19.796) 
R-squared 0.446 0.383 0.338 0.445 0.279 0.324 0.274  
Observations 193 193 182 191 191 191 190 
Year dumm. YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: All models contain controls for democracy, GDP per capita, openness to international trade, and global region. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
11 The results from this test are available from the authors on request as part of the replication set.  
12 In addition, we repeated our main specifications in Table 1 (columns 1, 3, 4, and 6) with a single observation per country, and our results remain 
statistically significant across these specifications. The results and replication set are available from the authors on request. 
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4.2. Collusive and extortive corruption 
Bribery can be described as either extortive or collusive corruption. It is extortive when a public official elicits a bribe from a 
business or individual. It is collusive if a prior agreement exists regarding a corrupt transfer in return for favorable treatment. A free 
press could, in principle, serve as an effective deterrent to both types of corruption. Indeed, Brunetti and Weder (2003) argue that the 
press might be the most effective institution for fighting collusive corruption given that official state anticorruption institutions could 
themselves be corrupted. Moreover, the competitive forces and nature of journalism might make collusive conspiracies more attractive 
targets from the perspective of journalists. 
Therefore, we extend our analysis to consider the role of press freedom in several different contexts. In particular, some of our 
indicators of corruption are more likely to capture collusive than extortive corruption. By examining the differences in our findings 
across these indicators, we can point to the possibility that a free press is a more effective deterrent in one case or another. In doing so, 
we examine each of the disaggregated components of Bribe—that is, the percentage of firms that say that a gift was expected or 
requested during meetings with tax officials or when obtaining construction permits, connections to water or electricity, import 
licenses, and operating licenses. In addition, we examine the association between corruption and press freedom when firms say they 
are expected to give gifts in order to secure government contracts. 
In Table 3, columns 1–7 report estimates using each of these outcomes as a dependent variable, respectively. Panel A presents 
estimates using Freedom House’s continuous indicator of press freedom, and Panel B reports estimates using its categorization of 
countries as free, partly free, and not free. Although these data do not enable us to claim that every act of bribery in a given context is 
collusive or extortive, certain categories are more likely to feature a dominant type of arrangement. Columns 1 and 2 consider the 
contexts of tax and construction. Collusive corruption is likely to be the dominant mode of corruption in these contexts, as a firm has no 
incentive to report corruption, and it is difficult for other officials to detect misreporting by the bribed official (Brunetti and Weder, 
2003).13 In both panels, we find statistically significant relationships between press freedom and the incidence of bribery in these 
contexts. 
Columns 3–6 examine situations that more closely fit the concept of extortive corruption as outlined in Brunetti and Weder (2003). 
In these types of interactions, the firm faces demand for a bribe by an official who controls access to a government service. The official 
can deny or delay the firm from accessing the government service. The Enterprise Surveys contain information on bribery in the pursuit 
of connections to water and electricity and import and operating licenses. Neither of these situations shows any significant association 
with press freedom. With respect to the incidence of bribery for firms seeking operating licenses, we find an association in Panel B. 
Countries with an unfree press are also those in which more firms pay bribes for operating licenses.14 
The final column examines corruption in the context of seeking government contracts. Corruption in public procurement is a 
perennial and serious issue that can involve substantial sums. We do not find a significant association between press freedom and this 
type of corruption. Given that these cases are of great interest to the public, this is somewhat surprising and suggests limits in the ability 
of a free press to expose corruption. 
Overall, these findings support the notion that the press is an effective external institution when it comes to reducing collusive 
corruption. Indeed, it is only effective at fighting this kind of corruption, and the absence of an association with extortive corruption is 
consistent with a rational disinterest by a profit-maximizing media industry. An alternative explanation is simply that taxes and 
Fig. 1. Press Freedom and Democracy.  
13 Brunetti and Weder (2003) consider construction permits extortive, but we think they fit better as collusive. If an act of corruption is revealed, 
the firm stands to lose a valuable property or otherwise face serious costs if it should not have been granted the permit in the first place. In other 
cases regarding permits, the firm might wish to reveal that corruption has taken place, as it was entitled to receive them and faced predatory 
behavior by an official.  
14 This finding is interesting in light of Djankov et al. (2002), who find that countries with heavier regulation on entry have higher corruption. 
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Table 4 
Democracy, Press Freedom, and Corruption.   
(1) (2) (3)  
Bribe Obstacle Tax 
Press Freedom Index 0.01 − 0.00 0.04  
(0.117) (0.049) (0.092) 
Democracy − 1.92** − 0.90** − 0.99**  
(0.968) (0.416) (0.412) 
Press freedom*Democracy 0.03** 0.01*** 1.55***  
(0.013) (0.005) (0.525) 
GDP per capita (log) − 5.10*** 0.43 − 5.16***  
(1.134) (0.569) (1.087) 
Openness (log) 3.16 2.49** 2.82  
(2.222) (1.011) (2.233) 
OECD − 1.01 − 2.60* − 3.73  
(2.227) (1.461) (2.392) 
Sub-Saharan Africa − 8.80*** − 1.44 − 9.02***  
(3.124) (1.393) (3.218) 
Latin America and the Caribbean − 14.11*** 0.24 − 13.17***  
(4.690) (2.440) (4.839) 
Constant 68.95*** 6.86 68.38***  
(12.781) (5.979) (13.359) 
Year dummies YES YES YES 
Observations 193 193 193 
R-squared 0.436 0.154 0.453 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1. 
Fig. 2. The Marginal Effect of Press Freedom on Corruption at Varying Levels of Democracy.  
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construction are more salient to media consumers, and therefore the press has a stronger incentive to investigate these types of in-
teractions between firms and the state, irrespective of their collusive or extortive character. In either case, we conclude that the press is 
an effective deterrent against only certain types of corruption. 
5. Democracy 
One might suspect that only democracies have a free press. From this perspective, our measure of press freedom simply captures the 
effect of democratic institutions and is correlated too highly with our measure of democracy. Fig. 1 illustrates the association between 
press freedom and democracy. The solid reference lines denote the generally accepted thresholds for full democracy (Polity IV score >
6) and press freedom (Freedom House free category = [0, 30]) and thus enable us to divide our data into democracies and non-
democracies that do or do not have a free press. The dashed reference line indicates the threshold separating Freedom House’s free and 
partly free press freedom categories. The results of this exercise confirm that democracy and press freedom often go together and that 
the co-occurrence of autocracy and press freedom is extremely rare. In fact, we find only one case—Suriname, which technically 
qualifies as a nondemocracy with a free press. Interestingly, we observe that some full democracies, such as Turkey and Pakistan, are 
ranked as not free in Freedom House’s categorization. In addition, a substantial number of countries have a democratic government 
but only a partly free press. In summary, any combination of democracy and press freedom is technically possible. 
One might also ask whether a free press is particularly effective in countries with democratic—that is, accountable—institutions. 
This is important from a policy-making standpoint, as efforts to promote a free press might combat corruption only in such envi-
ronments—perhaps as the press has the power only to expose, but not to punish. Businesses might also benefit from an appreciation of 
the interactions between various institutions before undertaking activities in a country. The hypothesis that democracy moderates the 
effect of press freedom on corruption has considerable support in the literature that measures corruption using the CPI and other 
perception-based indices. Examining a panel of 129 countries from 1980 to 2007, Bhattacharyya and Hodler (2015), for example, 
develop and test a model of the role of media freedom and democratic institutions, finding that they are complementary in the fight 
against corruption. Kalenborn and Lessmann (2013) study a cross section of 170 countries from 2005 to 2010 as well as a panel of 175 
countries from 1996 to 2010 to analyze the joint impact of democracy and press freedom on corruption, finding that they are com-
plements, rather than substitutes. A further study finds that the association between a free press and corruption is moderated by the 
level of political and social openness, often, but not exclusively, a feature of democracy (Charron, 2009). 
Table 4 introduces an interaction term between democracy and press freedom to our main specification. When we considered the 
additive effects of these variables in Table 1, only press freedom is associated with corruption; the level of democracy is statistically 
insignificant. When interacted, however, the interaction term captures the possibility that different combinations of press freedom and 
democracy have compound effects that are greater than the sum of their separate effects. Columns 1–3 present estimates for our main 
dependent variables, Bribe, Obstacle, and Tax. We include the latter variable in our tests because of our previous finding, which suggests 
that press freedom is more likely to play a role in this specific context.15 
We find that the interaction term is statistically significant in all models where it is included, suggesting that the effect of press 
freedom is moderated by the level of democracy. Fig. 2 graphs the marginal effect of press freedom at different levels of democracy 
across our three corruption indicators, holding our control variables constant at mean values. The vertical reference line marks the 
accepted threshold for democracy on the Polity IV scale. Fig. 2 shows that the interaction is significant only above the democratic 
threshold of 6, where the vertical reference line with 95 percent confidence interval no longer crosses the zero horizontal line. The only 
exception is for Obstacle, for which it is significant above 5. What these panels suggest is that the statistical relationship we observe is 
evident only at higher levels of democracy. In other words, the effect of improvements in press freedom becomes stronger as we move 
along the democratic axis, but only at or very near the threshold for full democracy. By contrast, at lower Polity IV scores, press 
freedom has no statistically significant effect on corruption. 
Therefore, on average, press freedom plays an important role in democratic countries and in those transitioning to democracy or 
backsliding to nondemocratic government. People and firms pursuing opportunities in nondemocratic countries might find it useful to 
consider the level of press freedom there. Even if our association of interest is evident only in democracies, it is still the case that it is 
evident for the majority of our observations. Specifically, freedom of the press is associated with a reduction in corruption in 116 out of 
193 of our observations. This exercise confirms that our main results are not applicable only to a few democratic countries that happen 
to enjoy press freedom. 
6. Conclusion 
The important role of an independent media in combating corruption will come as no surprise to scholars of corruption. Many 
studies have demonstrated a strong link between media attention and corporate governance. The role of the media is evident in cases 
such as the release of the Panama Papers and the Paradise papers, which revealed the widespread use of offshore financial centers for 
illegal purposes. This investigative journalism often comes at a high price: According to Transparency International (2018), between 
2012 and 2017, 368 journalists were murdered, at least 70 of whom were investigating corruption-related cases. 
What has received less attention is the role of an independent media in constraining less sensational types of corruption in business, 
15 We find no statistically significant association in the other contexts in business in which we tested the interaction of democracy and press 
freedom. 
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such as small bribes to obtain licenses and permits. Previous work presents strong evidence that the media shape perceptions of 
corruption, but no previous studies consider their role in shaping everyday corruption, as seen through the eyes of ordinary businesses. 
Furthermore, previous studies do not show which type of corrupt acts—extortive or collusive—the media are better at exposing. Our 
findings suggest that press freedom helps to combat everyday corruption in business-state interactions. Countries with greater press 
freedom have significantly fewer instances of bribery involving public officials, and fewer businesses in these countries report that 
corruption is the biggest problem they face. Moreover, a free press is associated with a substantial reduction in the percentage of firms 
that say a bribe was expected or requested during interactions with tax officials and in pursuit of construction permits. Finally, it 
appears that press freedom is most effective in combating collusive corruption and that its impact is highly concentrated in de-
mocracies and near-democratic societies. 
Corruption provides some businesses with unfair advantages while raising the cost of doing business for all. It is possible that larger 
firms are targeted for bribes and are better able to absorb such costs. Therefore, our findings suggest that press freedom may help to 
ensure a level playing field and significantly reduce the cost of doing business. For businesses, our findings suggest that understanding 
the media environment should be essential for firms engaging in cross-border activities. For governments and policy makers, our 
findings suggest that press freedom is an important weapon in the fight against corruption domestically and globally. International 
efforts to control corruption, such as the OECD’s Anti-Bribery Convention, should be matched by efforts to promote press freedom; 
although it is considered a fundamental human right in several international treaties, press freedom is continually under threat around 
the world.16 
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Appendix A  
Table A1 
Summary Statistics.  
Variable Definition Source N Mean Min Max SD 
Bribe Bribery index (the percentage of transactions in which a gift or informal payment 
was requested by a public official) 
(1) 193 15.28 0.00 65.20 14.39 
Obstacle Percentage of firms choosing corruption as their biggest obstacle (1) 193 7.39 0.00 32.50 5.98 
Press Freedom 
Index 
Freedom House Score; from 0 (best) to 100 (worst) (2) 193 52.90 10.00 95.00 19.63 
Tax Percentage of firms expected to give gifts in meetings with tax officials (1) 193 14.75 0.00 66.70 14.89 
Construction Percentage of firms expected to give gifts to get a construction permit (1) 193 24.36 0.00 91.60 19.39 
Water Percentage of firms expected to give gifts to get a water connection (1) 182 15.99 0.00 79.30 18.77 
Electricity Percentage of firms expected to give gifts to get an electrical connection (1) 191 16.58 0.00 71.10 16.64 
Import Percentage of firms expected to give gifts to get an import license (1) 191 15.12 0.00 87.70 18.79 
Operating Percentage of firms expected to give gifts to get an operating license (1) 191 16.58 0.00 100.00 18.41 
Gift Percentage of firms expected to give gifts to public officials "to get things done" (1) 191 26.05 0.00 90.70 20.44 
Government 
contract 
Percent of firms expected to give gifts to secure government contract (1) 190 31.30 0.00 99.10 21.79 
Democracy Polity score; "autocracies" (− 10 to − 6) and "democracies" (+6 to +10). (3) 193 4.46 − 9.00 10.00 5.44 
GDP per capita GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) (log) (4) 193 7.92 5.41 10.89 1.19 
Openness Exports and imports as a ratio of GDP (4) 193 0.84 0.20 2.12 0.37 
Sources: (1) World Bank Enterprise Surveys (2005–2017); (2) Freedom House (2005–2017); (3) Marshall, M.G., Jaggers, K. and Gurr, T.R., 2002. 
Polity IV project: Political regime characteristics and transitions, 1800–2002; (4) World Development Indicators. 
16 See Article 19 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (1966), and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950). 
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